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This report summarizes the discussion of over sixty participants
in the April 30, 2007 roundtable convened by the Duke Global
Capital Market Center. The roundtable focused on important issues
posed by the increasing globalization of securities offerings and
trading markets. The invited participants were selected because of
their broad experience as regulators, practitioners, or academics in
international securities transactions, assuring a wide spectrum of
1
views on the future direction of regulation.
SESSION ONE: WHAT CAN THE UNITED
STATES DO TO MAINTAIN ITS COMPETITIVE POSITION?
A. Defining the Problem
U.S. capital markets face more competition than in the past.
This reflects in large measure the greater choice enjoyed by foreign
issuers today than in the past. Not too many years ago, foreign
issuers had little choice in raising capital other than to do so in U.S.
capital markets. Due to improvements in several foreign markets,
foreign issuers have alternatives to U.S. capital markets. Further,
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there are weaknesses in the U.S. regulatory system that place U.S.
financial markets and their participants at a disadvantage. One such
problem is the multiplicity of regulators within the U.S. financial
market system. For example, a market participant can find that its
activities fall under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Controller of
the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Association
of Securities Dealers, and various state blue sky administrators, to
name just a few agencies with jurisdictions that frequently overlap
and that have differing regulatory styles and requirements. The
multiplicity of regulators is ever more present today because financial
market participants operate their businesses as consolidated groups
(banking, trading, underwriting, derivatives, etc.) with converging
products, as opposed to separate units. The burden posed by this
multiplicity of regulations is believed at times to drive innovation and
transactions from New York to London. This frequently means that
retail customers are left out of transactions or their participation
occurs later in the chain of events when the financial product flows
back to the United States. Because our current regulatory structure is
driving some products off-shore and thereby excluding U.S. retail
investors from participating in these products, U.S. retail investors are
deprived of the diversification benefits of holding a global portfolio.
There is a need to reexamine our regulatory framework and to
do so from the ground up, for equity and debt markets, as well as for
derivatives and other financial products. This reexamination must be
done with an eye toward making our markets more efficient and
maintaining our high standards for investor protection. To address
the various political and economic interests that have developed
around the existing multi-regulatory approach, any undertaking to
review the existing structure requires a high-level committee. One
such appropriate approach is action by the President’s Working
Group similar to that which led to successful reforms for futures and
derivatives. Problems exist here not just with the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but more significantly
with the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940 because they seriously restrict the products that
can be offered to retail investors in the United States.
The architecture of our future regulatory system must be
sensitive to the great differences that exist between institutional and
retail investors. When it comes to securities regulation, one size does
not fit all. Informed and efficient regulation should distinguish
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between the protections accorded institutional investors and retail
investors, with a much lighter hand in the former than the latter.
Moreover, in rethinking the future direction of reform, the cost of
regulations should be balanced with its benefits. Further, the past
practice of justifying regulation because of an extremely low risk of
abuse or fraud should be discontinued. This problem is particularly
acute for much of the regulation that occurs under the Investment
Company and Investment Advisors Acts.
B. Vision of Regulatory Reform
As noted earlier, financial services are converging in part
because their products are converging. For example, both insurance
and banking products frequently entail securities features. This
means that a single activity can implicate multiple regulators, both at
the federal and state level. Moreover, information sharing and
coordination among the various agencies is at best informal. While
most countries house their financial regulator within the elected
administration, the group felt that the independent regulatory agency
model that is embodied in the SEC has worked reasonably well.
Therefore, there is not a strong sentiment to move regulatory
functions to, for example, the U.S. Treasury Department. However,
it would be useful to explore ways to better involve industry members
in the regulatory functions such as occurs in the United Kingdom with
its Takeover Panel. This would be a means of embedding within the
regulatory process individuals who are the most knowledgeable. The
point was made that the physical location of the Financial Services
Authority (FSA), within the midst of major investment banking
community in London, likely makes its ties to the industry stronger.
While many may view any regulatory reform as a race to the
bottom, this need not be the case. In fact, evidence supports the view
that securities regulatory standards around the world have been
rising. The observation was made that, for example, as China’s
capital markets deepen, Chinese regulatory standards can be
expected to rise. This has been the case elsewhere and goes to some
measure to explain, as observed earlier, the new competitive market
facing U.S. capital markets. Thus, what may be the best image is
neither a race to the top or the bottom, but movement by all
important markets toward a socially-optimal regulatory equilibrium.
One question raised is whether the SEC has the capacity to
reform itself. This elicited several responses. First, as observed
earlier, the issues transcend the SEC. Financial market participants
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must contend, simply, with too many regulators on a regular basis.
This prompts our earlier suggestion for the President’s Working
Group. Second, to the extent that reform is to be focused solely on
the SEC, there are some dramatic illustrations of the agency’s success
in reforming itself, such as its actions following the Wheat Report and
the Sommer Report. Third, the SEC can effect part of the called-for
reform efforts simply by choosing how to exercise its existing
authority.
By being more consultative, and less enforcement
oriented—i.e., prudential—the agency can move reform without
having its statutory mandate changed.
C. The London Market
The vibrancy of the U.S. venture capital and private equity
industry is linked inextricably to the attractiveness of U.S. IPO
markets. Exit is everything to venture capitalists and private equity
firms, and that regularly occurs via a public offering in which the
venture capitalists and private equity firms liquidate some or most of
their holdings. Thus, capital formation is dependent upon the wellbeing of the U.S. IPO market. As captured in the Report of the
Committee on the Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets, the U.S.
markets do have several features that make them less attractive than
the London market: a robust securities class action regime, a
burdensome auditor attest function called for by section 404 of
Sarbanes Oxley, weaker shareholder governance rights than exist in
the United Kingdom, limited work visa availability, burdensome antimoney laundering requirements, multiple regulators as contrasted
with the single administrator in the United Kingdom, and a
regulatory posture that is more enforcement oriented than that of the
British FSA. On the latter point, the work of Professor Howell
Jackson captures a vast contrast in the number of enforcement
actions and the magnitude of sanctions in the United States versus the
2
United Kingdom. The question these data pose is whether there is
equal or even greater levels of compliance with regulatory

2. In the period from 2002 to 2004, annual average government (Department of Justice,
SEC, SROs and state) securities enforcement actions resulting is nearly $5.3 billion of monetary
sanctions as well as other civil and criminal penalties. Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the
Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 Yale J.
Reg. 253, 280, tbl. 3 (2007). Even when adjusted for relative market capitalization, the average
annual amount of monetary sanctions in public enforcement actions in the United Kingdom
over this period was approximately a tenth of that in the United States. Id. at 284, fig. 10.

06__COX_GREENE.DOC

2007]

FINANCIAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL MARKET PLACE

5/27/2008 1:30:37 PM

243

requirements in the United Kingdom than the United States without
the burdens and expense of enforcement proceedings.
One feature that likely explains the regulatory differences
between the London Market and the U.S. market is that the London
market was designed and regulated largely as an institutional or
wholesale market. In contrast, the U.S. securities framework is not so
focused, and so much of its orientation continues to be guided by
concerns for retail investors, even though in IPOs and most other
market activities price formation occurs at the institutional level. In
spite of this, much disclosure is guided to empower retail and not the
more dominant institutional investors. The wholesale character of
the U.K. market makes it possible for the FSA to be less enforcement
oriented. When it sees a problem arising from, for example, the
conflicting interests of the institutional investor and the underwriters,
it customarily raises its existence to the affected parties and allows
them to work through the problem; regulation or enforcement occurs
in the exceptional case where the practice is abusive and not likely to
be corrected or prevented by the actions of the investor. This reflects
the FSA’s view that there are different types of risks and different
types of investors so that its response is gauged accordingly. It is
likely time for the United States to reflect on its own markets and
conclude that its markets are, and for some time have been, largely
institutional markets. Regulation should, therefore, begin with this
premise. Where there is retail participation, a different approach is
appropriate. But much would likely be gained by designing at least
one entire regulatory framework exclusively from the perspective of
there being only institutional participation. In a sense, this would
embrace a strategy similar to that taken in derivative markets where
the President’s Working Group supported the passage of the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, under which
regulation is tiered according to investor sophistication, with less
regulation for transactions involving sophisticated individuals or
institutions.
D. Prudential and Principles-Based Regulation
The choice is not between principles or rules. Rather, the aim is
to achieve a better balance than presently exists, with rules as the
dominant norm. Similarly, the choice is not between consultation and
enforcement but rather more of the former and less of the latter. An
important component of a heavier emphasis on principles is that
regulated entities should move more of their compliance efforts to
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higher levels in the organizations, in order for senior management
and even the board of directors to engage in substantive regulatory
issues. Efforts, however, must also occur at the regulatory body. A
more prudential approach requires the regulator’s staff to know more
about the business of the regulated entities and to be able to deal
substantively with greater complexity. This shift necessarily involves
serious upgrading of the regulator’s staff. At the same time, the
regulated entities cannot be left adrift or, for that matter, without
meaningful guidance. Best practices and other guidelines must be
available to them. Otherwise, freedom can be a pretty scary
phenomenon. It may well be the case that more rules are appropriate
for transactions that enjoy greater participation by retail investors. In
any case, we can expect that even in a prudential, principles-based
world, compliance officers will feel a great need for guidance; this is
certainly the case if there is a likelihood of governmental or private
enforcement actions.
We might consider that disclosure is an area where a rules
approach has worked reasonably well. Moreover, the prevalence of
private litigation for disclosure violations likely calls for greater
clarity in disclosure requirements, such that a rules-oriented approach
to disclosure is appropriate. A more principles-based approach is
more likely in the market regulation, investment company and
advisor areas, where a candid dialogue can accomplish the same level
of investor protection without dampening innovation or introducing
costly circumvention efforts. Once again, one feature that would
greatly enhance the prudential approach is the regulator’s staff being
familiar with the regulatee’s business. This is a central feature of
banking regulation where the bank examiners are most familiar with
the bank’s operations.
E. Litigation and Enforcement Reform
Perhaps the major concern for foreign issuers contemplating
entering U.S. capital markets is the risk of private litigation.
Although the number of class action filings has dropped in recent
years, the dollar level of settlements is quite high. Moreover, there
has recently appeared willingness of federal courts to certify securities
class actions involving foreign issuers where a substantial portion of
the class members are foreign nationals.3 We question whether such

3. Examples where U.S. courts have certified as plaintiffs the so-called “f-cubed class,”
foreign purchasers who bought a foreign issuer’s securities on a foreign exchange, include Royal
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actions are in the interest of the United States or, for that matter,
necessary for investor protection. If not, it is appropriate for the
SEC, through its historical amicus role, to express its opinion that the
certification of a class action with substantial foreign class members
does not advance the purpose of the U.S. securities laws.
Additionally, private enforcement extracts sums that are nearly
eight times larger than government penalties and, as discussed earlier,
government enforcement itself is a non-trivial concern given the
current regulatory environment in the United States. We might also
question whether private litigation serves a meaningful compensatory
role in light of the fact that suits historically recover for the class a
very small percentage of the losses they have suffered and that in
many instances recoveries pose serious circularity issues, wherein
class members who continue to retain an interest in the defendant
company indirectly contribute to their own settlement.
While some have advised that arbitration or some other dispute
mechanisms be authorized as substitutes for the present system, there
was a division of opinion within the group whether this course was
either feasible or desirable. The feasibility question relates to the
absence of any history of class actions occurring within the arbitration
process as well as to the weak discovery procedures under current
arbitration procedures. What appeared attractive was developing
meaningful safe harbors for various groups, such as underwriters or
outside directors with respect to their due diligence exposure in
public offerings, or providing other protections via the SEC’s
exemptive and rulemaking authority in other provisions of the
securities laws.
SESSION TWO: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AMONG REGULATORS
There is evidence that regulators can and do from time to time
find it possible to converge their various regulatory regimes. When
they do converge or engage in mutual recognition, in a sense they
cede power or authority to their fellow regulators. Examples of
successful convergence are the Basel Banking Accords and the
centralization of monetary policy with currency unification in the
European Union. For there to be meaningful cooperation, regulators
Ahold, Royal Dutch Shell, Parmalat, Nortel Networks and Vivendi. See, e.g., In re Vivendi
Universal S.A. Sec. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec.
Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F.
Supp. 2d 334 (D. Md. 2004).
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on both sides of the border must have enhanced enforcement powers
such that a lead regulator is not limited by its national borders in
activities such as freezing assets, issuing subpoenas, investigating, or
even settling a matter (the SEC has this latter power but many other
securities regulators do not). The past experience of five European
nations cooperating in their regulation of Euronext and the
forthcoming cooperation between the SEC and European regulators
following the merger of Euronext and the NYSE are hopeful
illustrations how regulators can work together. These steps may
entail for some countries important changes in their laws, while for
others the changes will be less significant. Even with mutual
recognition, countries will likely retain the discretion to initiate their
own enforcement actions, most likely for fraud, should the competent
agency believe the foreign regulator’s steps are not adequate to
protect its investors. Outside the enforcement area, there is de facto
informal mutual recognition in the case of the easy access of U.S.based institutional investors to foreign 144A offerings. The question
for the U.S. regulators is whether the freedom enjoyed by
institutional investors should be extended to retail investors. As seen
earlier, a cost of not extending similar freedoms to participate in
foreign markets is the friction created for retail investors in acquiring
global diversity in their personal portfolios. One approach is to
proceed with a pilot program in which one or possibly two or three
EU countries would be targeted for an initial program with a
designated lead regulator or a pilot program that is focused on
characteristics of the investor—i.e., qualified purchasers. A concern
is avoiding politicization of the process. This can be best achieved by
having clear and understandable criteria before engaging in mutual
recognition.
There was discussion regarding the meaning of mutual
recognition. The view was expressed that mutual recognition does
not mean, and its application is not predicated upon, transactions
between investors in one country, the host country, and a product or
service provider from another country, the home country, receiving
the same treatment as if the transaction was entirely within the local
market or legal system. What mutual recognition entails is a
judgment that the home market’s regime and systems are sufficiently
efficient and protective that U.S. investors do not encounter
unreasonable risks by participating in transactions governed by the
rules of the home market. There was a view that countries must
retain residual authority for the host country to carry out
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enforcement efforts, particularly, or perhaps solely, with respect to
fraud, where it is believed necessary for investor protection or to
provide relief where otherwise the remedy is believed inadequate.
Also, there is cause to believe that the degree and content of mutual
recognition should vary with the actor, so that the contours of mutual
recognition for issuers will not be the same as for the regulation of
brokers or investment advisors. Similarly, the characteristics of
classes of investors will be an important factor in decisions to engage
in mutual recognition. Also, local regulators are likely to retain wide
discretion to take remedial and protective actions at least within their
own territorial borders.
There are some areas where coordination or cooperation can
only occur if there is some major rethinking of the focus of U.S.
regulation. One such area is the regulation of takeovers, where the
U.S. approach is quite different from that of Europe or Asia. In other
countries there is the ability to acquire significant amount of stock
rather quickly and without much fanfare up to thirty to fifty percent,
at which point a mandatory bid for all remaining shares must be
made. U.S. regulation exempts foreign issuers from many of our
tender offer rules, provided that U.S. investors hold less than ten
percent of the issuer’s shares. With the globalization of holdings this
Tier I exemption has largely become meaningless. Foreign issuers,
thus, who are the subject of tender offers pose serious regulatory
problems for their suitors.
Cooperation among regulators in the enforcement area would
achieve a good deal of efficiencies. On this point there is at best a
spotty and uneven record of success, but there are some causes for
hope. For example, in the investigation of Royal Dutch Shell, the
FSA and SEC divided their tasks and shared information and further
cooperated in the design of appropriate sanctions. Such coordination
and cooperation is difficult to imagine with respect to private
enforcement actions where, as discussed earlier, there is a legitimate
basis for fears on the part of foreign issuers that small U.S.-based
investor holdings may provide a basis for class action recoveries on
behalf of their larger number of non-U.S. investors.
One objective sought by foreign issuers is legal and regulatory
predictability. This quest has greater salience in the context of
instituting governing rules or principles because an overarching
framework can provide a context for interpreting the relative
importance of breaches of particular rules. Parties wish to know in
advance what is expected of them. If articulated and understood,
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when rules are violated in a material way, it is not difficult to accept
that sanctions will follow, even if there is some uncertainty as to the
gravity of the sanctions. Rather, predictability is more valuable in the
compliance context, in determining what kinds of breaches merit a
serious enforcement action. At the same time, as observed by many,
the SEC has sometimes used its enforcement efforts as a means for
establishing rules, practices, and norms. In this context there is an
element of surprise because there was not an articulated and
understood rule that preceded the enforcement effort.
This
phenomenon is unsettling. At the same time, predictability in
enforcement is less of a concern when the object of the enforcement
action is merely to require that challenged conduct cease; concerns
for predictability are heightened if the regulator seeks not only
cessation of the conduct but to impose a fine or other sanction on the
respondent. However, these concerns for predictability are not
unique to foreign issuers or global trading; the concerns arise as well
for purely domestic transactions. Nonetheless, the SEC should
appreciate the impact this uncertainty, particularly in conjunction
with uncertainty surrounding increased criminalization of capital
markets participants and transactions, has on the attractiveness of
U.S. capital markets since uncertainty is never a desired quality.
A final concern with developing a vision for regulation is
whether markets will over time evolve to be merely electronic places
in space without a home country in any traditional sense. This image
poses the ultimate challenge for a cooperative, borderless approach to
globalization of offerings and trading.
SESSION THREE: DISCLOSURE METHODS
AND ACCOUNTING IN A GLOBAL MARKET PLACE
As we look at how SEC disclosure practices have in many areas
reflected disclosure approaches embraced by IOSCO, and vice versa,
it is apparent that in many respects there already is mutual
recognition in disclosure issues. There has been a good deal of
progress in identifying within major capital markets at least the areas
for which mandatory disclosure should occur. A major qualification
of this is with respect to accounting disclosures, where reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP continues to be required. However, recently not only
did the SEC embrace the nearly imminent prospect that International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) will be acceptable for foreign
issuers entering U.S. markets, but also suggested that IFRS could
perhaps be used by domestic issuers. The movement to IFRS and
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U.S. GAAP as primary systems for financial reporting will be the
most significant step toward having truly global capital markets.
Acceptance of IFRS reflects not that standards have converged to the
extent that they are now mirror images of each other. Indeed, each
system differs and will continue to differ from the other in important
ways so that users of each can likely learn much by more closely
examining and borrowing from the other. What the pending SEC
developments reflect is a high comfort level with the overall quality of
IFRS, not the close proximity on all reporting metrics of IFRS to U.S.
GAAP. There is a lingering concern, however, that IFRS may suffer
from acute balkanization in that each or many countries within the
European Union may have their own IFRS variations on numerous
matters. This phenomenon can be held within reasonable limits by a
strong central European regulator overseeing reporting practices
within the European Union. With respect to auditing practices and
procedures, the SEC and Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) have wisely followed a course of working closely
with individual countries’ national accounting organizations to
achieve similar levels of comfort with their systems and our
expectations.
These informal cooperative efforts have been
successful and should be continued. Another qualification is that a
greater similarity in disclosure practices exist between the European
Union and United States than between Hong Kong or Japan and the
United States. Thus, in those countries convergence does not exist at
the regulatory level but rather via practices imposed by private
ordering within the sophisticated Rule 144A offering market.
With respect to the accounting industry itself, there are
significant structural concerns, the most observable being the high
level of concentration of auditing services among the Big Four
accounting firms. Indeed, in some industry classifications most of the
auditing is concentrated in two or sometimes even a single Big Four
firm. A particular concern that arises from concentration is whether
this impacts the quality of auditing services. The bright side is that
the revenues of non-Big Four firms are growing at a far faster rate
than for the Big Four among non-Fortune 500 firms. Therefore, for
firms, for example, in the Russell 2000 there is a reasonable choice
among auditors.
One factor that might contribute to firm
concentration is that state professional requirements compel auditing
firms to be organized as partnerships and also restrict ownership to
licensed accountants so that firms are seriously restricted in their
ability to raise capital. A more significant factor that contributes to
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concentration is the reputational issue, which appears to be
embedded in firm size such that smaller firms will continue to enjoy a
diminished standing vis-à-vis the Big Four and, accordingly, will
remain smaller firms. Large companies do not want to take the
reputational risk of being audited by other than a Big Four firm.
Moreover, there is a feasibility issue within certain industry
classifications so that there are, as a practical matter, only two or
sometimes three accounting firms that have the experience and staff
to perform an audit of the firm.
Since little is known about the financial resources of individual
Big Four firms it is not possible to conclude how large a threat they
face from litigation. However, their risks are largely uninsurable due
to the lack of meaningful actuarial data. Firms are, thus, self-insured.
As such, each firm faces the non-trivial risk of large judgments should
there be an audit failure. Also, given the threat of non-proportional
liability that exists under the securities laws and the significant losses
investors can suffer at the hands of reporting errors, auditors have
little choice than to settle, once a motion to dismiss the suit against
them has been lost. These considerations present the case for some
sensible limit on the liability of accountants (and perhaps others such
as outside directors or underwriters). Liability fears have had an
effect in constricting auditors’ engagement in the reporting process to
the financial statements such that their review and participation in
other reporting areas—i.e., the MD&A—is less likely today than in
years earlier.
The question was raised whether limiting the
accountants’ liability is consistent with a regime of unlimited
underwriter liability when the latter has significantly less time
allocated to the issuer’s transactions and its preparation than the
former.
One area of friction for a foreign issuer entering U.S. capital
markets is the greater independence requirements for auditors in the
United States. This may well force the issuer into changing its
accountant, which, due to a variety of considerations, it is ordinarily
unwilling to do. Some expressed the view that the SEC would be
well-advised to reexamine the standards for auditor independence
against the practices that exist in competing markets.
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